Statehood and Consent in International Law

“Despite the developments of recent years, statehood and consent remain at the heart of international law.”

This article will consider this statement in relation to the following areas of Public International Law:

(a) the sources of international law;

(b) international legal personality;

(c) the settlement of international disputes.

Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 international relations have been governed by the principle of sovereign equality.  In moving from a vertical, hierarchical structure to a horizontal structure that views fellow ‘members’ as equal, State consent became synonymous with state sovereignty.  The principles of statehood and consent underpin the UN Charter; only states can be members and they must freely agree to abide by all Charter provisions.  These provisions place states and their consent at the heart of international law. Whilst Judge Rosalyn Higgins is accurate when she asserts that “States are…still at the heart of the international legal system”[1] there is also truth in Kofi Annan’s view that “sovereignty is undergoing a significant transformation”[2] and even in Bickerton et. al’s opinion that “state sovereignty is in retreat on all fronts”[3]. Following a brief discussion about the wider developments in international relations this essay will argue that whilst developments are threatening the role of statehood and consent, international law remains driven by, at least for the time being, the will of states[4].

Over the past fifty years globalisation has come to dominate the way in which international relations are conducted and as a result states are now more interconnected.  The end of the Cold War and the prevailing neoliberal ideology has provided the platform for globalisation. The proliferation of free trade, instant communications and the increase in cross border traffic have diminished the prominence of traditional borders and made interstate cooperation essential.  Growing interconnectedness led Thomas Frank to predict a ‘post-ontological era’ in which, because of consensus, law would need only to focus on the sustentative content of law and not whether a law exists.  Frank’s prediction has been discredited by the complexity of global issues such as the environment, terrorism and the trafficking of arms, people and drugs[5].  In addition states have increasingly adopted a people centred people centred approach which places emphasis on human rights and humanitarian concerns.  International law has responded to many of these developments, most notably in the area of human rights issues, but whilst the freedom of states has been limited developments have “left the basic structure of international law unchanged[6]”.

The sources of international law are enshrined in the statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  Article 38(1) provides that law derives directly from conventions, custom and general principles and that judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified publicists are subsidiary means for determining law.  A hierarchy of sources was abolished in 1946 but there remains an informal structure that values convention over custom and convention and custom over general principles.  Overriding any source of law are peremptory norms or jus cogens laws.  These laws relate to issues such as genocide, acts of terrorism, piracy, slavery, torture and wars of aggression.  No derogation from these laws is permitted and no other source of law can trump a jus cogens law.  This is a state centrist system that, in favouring conventions and treaties, regards codified consent as the primary source of law.   This being said, in considering recent developments, some such as Charney describe “the role of consent [as] limited, at best”[7] and others such as Byers and Chesterman argue that a ‘hegemonial approach’ has been adopted which favours the consent of the powerful states and thus undermines smaller states[8].

Greater global communication and an increase in global issues has led to a rise in the number of international treaties.  In many respects treaties are the definitive proof that consent underpins international law.  Article 2(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that they can only be concluded by states, they only legally bind the parties to them, they must be ratified by the domestic instruments of states, if they incorporate obligations for a third state, consent to this must be put in writing and states can opt out of individual obligations as they wish[9].   In discrediting the role of consent in the obligations created by treaties, Charney highlights pact sunt servanda as the actual source of a legal obligation[10].  Based on good faith this doctrine means that states must respect that that they have agreed to and because pact sunt servanda remains despite domestic government change, a state continues to be bound by a treaty’s obligations even if consent no longer exists or if the state is no longer able to fulfil its obligations[11].  The increase in volume of treaties does limit the activities of a state but their adoption remains the prerogative of states whose consent is essential in concluding the process.   While treaties require actual consent “such consent is not required for customary norms”[12].

Customary international law traditionally originates from consistent state practice and opinio juris sive necessititas or the belief by states that they were acting in a particular way because they considered themselves legally bound to do so.  Unless a state has persistently objected to an obligation as it has emerged, which is extremely rare, customary law is binding on all states.  Further to this, the level of consent involved in proving opinio juris can be very low. Whilst the Lotus Case (1926) defended consent as the basis for legal obligation, Judge Sorenson’s opinion that opinio juris is only not there when a state actively opposes[13] means that silence can be translated as acquiesance.  Modern communications advances have led to fast paced international relations which have in turn impacted on the speed in which laws are created.  The “modern”[14] or “instant”[15] custom of today relies less on state practice than on looking to a range of non traditional sources in order to ascertain opinio juris.

The declarations made by the General Assembly have come to exercise some “quasi legislative” competence[16]. Thirlway argues that resolutions are “convenient material sources of law, inasmuch as they state, with apparent authority, propositions of general law, and are often assented to by a very large majority of the Members”[17].  Resolutions are used as material sources by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and Nicaragua V United States, 1986, notably demonstrated the ICJ’s view of their impact.  In establishing opinio juris the ICJ ruled that with regards to the use of force, “Consent to such resolutions [particularly resolution 2625 (XXV)[18]] is one of the forms of expression of an opinio juris”[19].  This judgement upholds the importance of widespread consent in the process of a resolution becoming custom. The 1974 Nuclear Test Cases also awarded unilateral statements legislative power. The ICJ ruled that because France had consistently reiterated its decision to halt all nuclear tests in the Pacific it had taken on legal obligations and the court would not subsequently uphold the legality of further tests in the region[20].  Following the NATO intervention in Kosovo it is also being argued that a new peremptory norm has formed that accepts intervention on humanitarian grounds and undermines the sovereignty of smaller states.

There has never been agreement on a definitive list of jus cogens laws or on how they originate but some, including Holbrook, claim that “in the face of a humanitarian agenda which asserts that the rights of individuals should take priority over the rights of state sovereignty”[21]   “there is a humanitarian right of intervention that exists outside of the UN Charter”[22]. The 1998 NATO intervention in Kosovo is often justified on the basis that states acted out of consensus and “out of respect for a law that ranks higher than the law which protects the sovereignty of states”[23].   If this argument reflected reality it would mean that a radical change in the international legal system has occurred and the consent of powerful states matters most when establishing the presence of a law[24].  During the Kosovo intervention states frequently affirmed the principle of non-intervention in the General Assembly and twice, 133 developing states of the G77 adopted declarations that condemned the bombing as illegal[25].

In considering this issue Byers and Chesterman note that because of the growing number of small states and the escalating gulf between military and economic might, powerful states do have a vested interest in undermining the sovereignty of smaller states[26].  Even if this is the case in international relations (which it undoubtedly is) in international law powerful states have been given this status consensually by other states.  For example, in the United Nations the Security Council is the only official law making organ favouring the five permanent members, in the EU voting systems are proportional and based on population and all treaty law is the product of bargaining where powerful states naturally have more leverage.  Although there may be an attempt “to mould [international] law to accommodate the shifting practices of the powerful”[27] and equality may be a fiction, international law still depends on the consent of all parties[28].   Moreover, only states can permit new states into international law, possess full legal personality and endow a non-state entity with legal personality.

The criteria for statehood is laid out in the 1933, Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States.  Article 1 provides:

“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.”[29]  Traditionally the declaratory theory has had the most support and Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states that “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states”[30].  This theory argues that once all criteria have been fulfilled a state only needs to declare itself as a state to be recognised under international law.  As a member of the Baddinter Commission Judge Lauterpacht expressed his opinion that there is an obligation to recognise a state once it has met the criteria[31].  This idea was upheld when the claim made by Iraq that its invasion of Kuwait was lawful because it did not recognise Kuwait was rejected by the international community. State practice has however, appeared to support the constitutive theory and “further considerations, such as the process of formation of the state and even the observance of human rights, may be relevant to statehood”[32].  The 1991 EC Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union confirms the importance of recognition affirming that recognition by the Community enables “establishment of diplomatic relations”[33].  In this sense it can be argued that a “state is not born, but chosen as a subject of international law”[34].

To highlight this development collective recognition of a state can go as far as to correct the lack of one of the criteria.  In the cases of Zaire and Guinea Bissau both were accepted as members of the UN without having effective governments and in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia civil wars were still raging, whereas Tibet and Taiwan have never been recognised[35].  Although there may be an obligation to recognise states as Judge Lauterpacht claims, there is no formal method of enforcing this and, as Lauterpacht also notes, in relation to state recognition “there is probably no other subject in the field of international relations in which law and politics appear to be more closely interwoven”[36].  States decide who they will conduct relations with and as such confer criteria i.e. (d) “capacity to enter into relations with other states”.

Non-recognition is in fact a vital method of enforcement when states declare themselves in spite of their formation being in conflict with international law.  The 1960 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) recognises the right to self determination of peoples and can be seen as another criteria for statehood.  In the case of Rhodesia however all criteria had been met but it was not recognised because the white ruling minority were seen to be suppressing the right to self determination of the majority of the black population.  States continued to conduct relations with the British colonial administration[37].  Recognition of a fellow state is ultimately the sole decision of states and once statehood is achieved there is very little that can jeopardise its legal personality.

Although states are not the only entities with legal personality in international law only states are true legal personalities and other actors are legal subjects.  On declaring itself, a state will usually affirm its intentions to adhere to international law and on doing so defines itself as having rights and duties.  Even when a state looses effective government, as in the cases of Somalia in 1975 and Lebannon in 1990, statehood cannot be removed[38].  States can voluntarily surrender a part of its legal entity but the entity must only be a matter of agency.  Lichtenstein handing over its foreign relations to Switzerland is an example.  In the Austro-German Customs Union Case the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that a state is not subject to any other authority than international law[39].  If a state is found to be entirely reliant on another, as Manchuria was on Japan, only then is a state no longer a state.  The only way any other actor gains legal personality is through the consent of states.

States conduct the majority of their international affairs through international organisations and Berridge cites the number of Inter Governmental Organisations as rising from 37 in 1909 to 372 in 1985, followed by a small decline owing to the end of the Cold War tensions, to 245 in 2004.[40]  The level of personality held by an IGO is dependent upon the intentions of its members and some, specifically the UN, are equipped with objective personality.  In the 1949 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case the UN sought the ICJ’s opinion as to whether it was able to bring a claim against Israel for the death of a UN worker.  The ICJ ruled that an organisation could submit a claim to it if the organisation was intended to have personality detached from its members and the organisation enjoys detachment in practice[41]. The UN fulfils these criteria and along with the EC, WTO and ICC, enjoys the ability to submit requests for advisory opinions to the ICJ. Objective personality of IGOs is the focus of D’Aspremont’s call for a change of system.  He argues that if a wrongful act is committed it constitutes a breach of the members’ obligations if the act is committed by them[42]. In highlighting this issue it can also be deduced that the UN (and also the EC) is classed as a supranational entity capable of committing acts independently from its members.  As D’Aspermont stresses however, states are still the drivers of IGOs and their consent dictates the actions of these organisations. As is the case when considering sub-state entities, states should be held responsible for their actions even if carried out through another subject of international law.

Some sub-state entities/actors do have legal personality and some even have the capacity to enter into treaties.  It has often been claimed that this was a colonial or Cold War phenomenon but in recent years Swiss Cantons, German and Austrian Länder, Hong Kong, Bermuda, Jersey, The Cook Islands, New Caledonia, Quebec, Puerto Rico, Tatarstan, and Flanders have all concluded treaties[43].  Oliver Lissitzyn lists two requirements to be met in order for a sub-state entity to enter into treaties: (1) the consent of the state responsible for the sub-state actor; and (2) the willingness of the sub-state actor’s treaty partners to regard it as capable of entering into treaties.  In recent years however, these actors are increasingly acting independently without authorisation, subverting the consent of the state.   For example, in 2000, the U.S. state of Missouri concluded a Memorandum of Agreement with the Canadian province of Manitoba on water issues without Congressional authorisation[44] and Quebec has concluded some 230 “ententes” with foreign governments, nearly 60% of which were with foreign states[45].  The reality is though that the legal status of these agreements is “murky” as they are often political in nature, there is little to show what would happen if a dispute occurred between the parties and the sovereign state still either needs to agree them or recognise them under international law.

The position of statehood and consent is most enshrined within the settlement of international disputes but it is also the area where international politics is becoming most intertwined with international law.  Article 2 of the UN Charter declares that “all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means” and Article 33 states that those means include, but are not restricted to, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or resort to regional agencies. In making these assertions the Charter outlaws the use of force in the settlement of disputes and whilst there are times where force is inevitably used, states usually uphold their duty to cooperate and seek political methods of resolution with or without the aid of third parties[46].

Political/diplomatic resolution is favoured by states and in using methods such as mediation and negotiation they are usually able to secure additional benefits in return for concluding a dispute and can also maintain some kind of control.  There has been an unprecedented rise in the number of disputes where mediation is the chosen settlement method and it has been used in conflicts such as in El Salvador, Mozambique, Guatemala, Namibia, Rwanda, Angola, Liberia and Cambodia.  Peters explains that states may view mediation as “the ideal dispute settlement strategy” because “it shares the advantages of adjudication, namely the issuance of an informed, reasoned, neutral judgment, while at the same time imposing no commitment on the parties to accept”[47].  State acceptance of settlement methods is also key in terms of ICJ judgements.

As the judicial means for settling international disputes the ICJ only has jurisdiction when a case is brought to it by a member state and in the meantime states can choose how they seek to resolve a dispute.  Judicial settlement is the last resort though and other methods are usually exhausted before an application to the court is made.  In the event that a dispute is submitted to or an opinion is asked of the ICJ then there is still a lot of scope for a state to mould the proceedings to their preferences.  Arbitration is also fast becoming to preferred method of involving the court which only strengthens the role of consent.

States can choose a number of options including the arbitrators involved, the length of proceedings, the form of the process (e.g. in person or in writing) and whether the proceedings are open or confidential.

Ultimately “whether [the court] actually resolves the dispute…depends partly on whether the parties…are prepared to treat it as binding”[48].  In reality though states do tend to abide by its decisions and the Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission and Claims Commission, both created in 2000, even points to the possibility that “the ideological, highly sovereignty-conscious reserved attitude of so-called third world countries towards binding adjudication is most likely diminishing”[49] and the authority of the ICJ is increasing.  As mentioned previously most disputes do not make it to the ICJ and are usually dealt with through political/diplomatic channels, and often with assistance from the UN Security Council.

The UN Charter provides for the Security Council to make appropriate recommendations (Article 36(1)) and to step in where the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security (Article 37(2)).  During the Cold War the Security Council was ineffective and unable to fulfil these roles but since the 1990’s it has become involved in a number of disputes.  Up until the invasion of Iraq in 1990 the Security Council had passed 659 resolutions in 45 years but between 1990 and 1997 it passed 400[50].  Some realists criticise the Security Council’s abilities because it is a political institution capable of exercising “opportunistic flexibility” and it is not governed by the rule of law[51].  Alvarez[52] and Turk[53] both consider the need to extend the ICJ’s mandate to allow it to review the decisions of the Security Council as it is a political institution being allowed to make decisions and enforce measures on other states based on the interests of the permanent five.

The notion of international peace and security is difficult to define and the Security Council has a “wide margin of discretion to give specific meaning to such broad notions as ‘threats to peace’”[54].  Following the 1988 bombing of Pan American flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland the Security Council demonstrated that it is capable of and willing to make judgements that supersede existing conventions and enter into the sphere of a state’s sovereignty.      Resolutions 731 and 748 (1992) ordered Libya to comply with the demands of the US and United Kingdom and extradite the Libyan suspects for investigation and trial[55]. Despite this judgement contradicting the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation according to which a state has judicare, the duty to prosecute or extradite, in April 1992 the ICJ ruled in support of the resolutions.  The court ruled that Libya had no recourse to provisional measures and even though Libya had rights under the Montreal Convention obligations created by a Security Council Resolution “prevail over the obligations under any other agreement”[56].

The Security Council has made numerous decisions since the end of the Cold War that infringe the consent of smaller states and in the between 1990 and 2005 the Council agreed more than 90 per cent of the total resolutions ever made pertaining to enforcement[57].   The inclusion of ten non-permanent members has not gone far enough to limit the power of the permanent five. In demonstrating the dominance of the powerful states in the agreement of a Security Council Resolution, Byers and Chesterman cite the consequences to Yemen when it voted against Security Council Resolution 678 which authorised Operation Desert Storm.  Following its vote against the invasion Yemen lost US $70million in annual aid from the US[58]. The Council’s politically motivated interpretation of threats to international peace and security has also led to double standards in the settlement of disputes.  For example, the Council ruled for action in Kosovo and Iraq but after the genocide had started, voted to pull out the peacekeepers out of Rwanda.  It has frequently taken sides and even rhetoric about human rights concerns has not produced more balanced resolutions despite being used as justification for humanitarian intervention becoming a new peremptory norm.

In conclusion, whilst there is evidence to show that the role of statehood and consent has been diminished, they remain at the heart of international law.  In relation to the sources of international law states still retain control over the obligations and rights that they take on.  States are still the only personalities within the international legal system with full capability and ability to choose the level of personality that they want other actors to have.  In the main disputes are settled consensually between states and ICJ judgements are accepted as binding.  The most obvious threats to the future of statehood and consent will be new sources of international law that place less emphasis on consent, emerging non-state personalities and a powerful, unaccountable Security Council.  The position of powerful states will be crucial to the future of international law because their increasing propensity to become involved in the domestic affairs of states is subverting the will of smaller states.  As powerful states pursue the right to humanitarian intervention and use their might in the Security Council sovereign equality is becoming more of an ideal than a reality.  For now though, “International law is…still primarily of application to states and states are, at this moment in history, still at the heart of the international legal system”[59].   As Dean Acheson said in 1963, “No law can destroy the state creating the law” and “the survival of states is not a matter of law”[60].

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[1] Warbrick, C.  ‘States and Recognition in International Law’ in Evans, M (ed.). International Law.  Oxford University Press 2^nd Ed. (2006) pg.230

[2] Holbrook, J. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Recasting of International Law’ in Chandler, D (ed.). Rethinking Human Rights. Palgrave Macmillan (2002) pg.152

[3] Bickerton, C, Cunliffe, P & Gourevitch, A. Politics without sovereignty, UCL Press (2007) pg.1.

[4] Faulk, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in Dixon, M and Mcorquodale, R.  Cases and Materials of International Law. Oxford University Press (2003) Pg.20.

[5] Hollis, D. ‘Why State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources’ in Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, No.1 (2005) pg.1

[6] Schreurer, C. The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards and New Paradigm in International Law? European Journal of International Law Vol.4, No.1 (1993). Pg.448

[7] Charney, J. ‘Universal International Law’ in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87 (1993) Pg.534.

[8] Byers, M & Chesterman, S. ‘Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international law’ in Holzgrefe, J & Keohane, R. Humanitarian intervention: ethical, legal and political dilemmas. Cambridge University Press (2003) Pg.203.

[9] 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Accessed at www.untreaty.un.org on 25/04/2010

[10] Charney. J (1993) Pg.534.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid. Pg.531.

[13] See North Sea Continental Shelf Case (1968)

[14] Roberts, A.  ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconcilliation’. The American Journal of International Law.  Vol, 95, No.4 (Oct. 2001)

[15] Sloan, B. ‘General Assembly Resolutions Revisited’. 58 Brit Ybk Int’l L 39 (1987)

pg. 71.

[16] Falk, R. ‘On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly’ in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Oct, 1966). pp. 782-791

[17] Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in Evans (ed.) (2006) pp.136-137

[18] Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the charter of the United Nations. 24^th October 1970.

[19] Nicaragua v United States, 27^th June 1986, accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5 Retrieved on 6^th November 2009.

[20]  Thirlway in Evans(ed.). (2006) pg.135.

[21] Holbrook in Chandler, D (2003) Pg.136.

[22] Ibid. Pg.141.

[23] Geoffrey Robertson QC. Quoted by Holbrook in Chandler (ed.) (2003) Pg.147.

[24] Byers, M & Chesterman, S. (2003) Pg.203.

[25] Ibid. Pg.183.

[26] Byers, M & Chesterman, S. (2003) pg.194.

[27] Ibid. Pg.203.

[28] Charlesworth, H & Chinkin, C. The boundaries of international law: a feminist analysis. Manchester University Press (2000) Pg.124

[29] Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 1933. Accessed at http://www.cfr.org/publication/15897/montevideo_convention_on_the_rights_and_duties_of_states.html retrieved on 2/05/2010

[30] Ibid.

[31] Shah, S. ‘International Legal Personality: Statehood and Recognition”, Lecture Notes, Principles of Public International Law, University of Nottingham. (Oct. 2009).

[32] Charlesworth, H & Chinkin, C. (2000) Pg.126

[33] Dixon, M & McCorquodale, R. (2003) Pg.159.

[34] Hillgruber, C. ‘The Admission of New States to the International Community’ in European Journal of International Law Vol.9, No.3 (1998) Pg. 492

[35] It is debated whether Tibet and Taiwan have met the criteria as states have not recognised them even in times when China has been weak and political relations with China have had little importance.  See Sautman, B. “All that glitters is not gold: Tibet as a pseudo-state” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Monograph, No. 197 (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, (2009) pp.14-17

[36] Hillgruber, C. (1998) pg.491

[37] Hillgruber, C. (1998) pp.505-506

[38] Shah, S. Lecture Notes, Principles of Public International Law. October 2009.

[39] Austro-German Customs Union Case. Permanent Court of International Justice (1931). Accessed at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1931.09.05_customs/ retrieved on 2/05/2010

[40] Berridge, G. R, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan. (2005). pg.151.

[41] Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Advisory Opinion of 11^th April 1949.  Accessed at www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/gautier_4.pdf Retrieved on 2/05/2010

[42] D’Aspremont, J. ‘The Abuse Of The Legal Personality Of International Organizations And The Responsibility Of Member States’ in International Organizations Law Review, Vol.4, No. 91 (2007). Pg.1

[43] Hollis, D. (2005) pg.11

[44] Ibid. pg.14

[45] Ibid. pg.15

[46] Bowett, D. ‘Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the Settlement of Disputes’, 180 Receuil des Cours 169 (1983-II) cited in Dixon, M & McCorquodale, R. (2003) pg.576

[47] Peters, A. ‘International Dispute Settlement: A Network of Cooperational Duties’ 14 Eur J Int’l L 1 (2003). Pg.6

[48] Merrils, J. ‘The Means of Dispute Settlement’ in Evans,M. (2006). Pg.545

[49] Peters, A. (2003) pg.7

[50] Akande, D. ;The ICJ and the Security Council: Is there Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?’ 46 Int & Comp L Q 309 (1997). Pg.309

[51] Alvarez, J. ‘Judging the Security Council’. 90 Am J Int’l L 1 (1996) pg.2

[52] Ibid.

[53] Turk, D. ‘Improving Decision Making in the Security Council’ in Lee, Swords and Plowshares: Building Peace Through the United Nations. Koninklijke (2006).

[54] Turk, D. (2006) pg.2.

[55] Ibid. pp.5-6

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid. pg.2

[58] Byers, M & Chesterman, S. (2003) pg.192.

[59] Warbrick, C. in Evans, M. (2006) pg.230

[60] Dixon, M and Mcorquodale, R.  Cases and Materials of International Law. Oxford University Press (2003) pg.2

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Berridge, G. R, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan. (2005)

Bickerton, C, Cunliffe, P & Gourevitch, A. Politics Without Sovereignty, UCL Press (2007)

Charlesworth, H & Chinkin, C. The boundaries of international law: a feminist analysis. Manchester University Press (2000)

Chapters in Edited Books

Byers, M & Chesterman, S. ‘Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international law’ in Holzgrefe, J & Keohane, R. Humanitarian intervention: ethical, legal and political dilemmas. Cambridge University Press (2003)

Faulk, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in Dixon, M and Mcorquodale, R.  Cases and Materials of International Law. Oxford University Press (2003)

Holbrook, J. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Recasting of International Law’ in Chandler, D (ed.). Rethinking Human Rights. Palgrave Macmillan (2002)

Merrils, J. ‘The Means of Dispute Settlement’ in Evans, M. International Law.  Oxford University Press 2^nd Ed. (2006).

Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in Evans (ed.) International Law.  Oxford University Press 2^nd Ed. (2006)

Turk, D. ‘Improving Decision Making in the Security Council’ in Lee, Swords and Plowshares: Building Peace Through the United Nations. Koninklijke (2006).

Warbrick, C.  ‘States and Recognition in International Law’ in Evans, M (ed.). International Law.  Oxford University Press 2^nd Ed. (2006)

Journal Articles

Akande, D. ‘The ICJ and the Security Council: Is there Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?’ 46 Int & Comp L Q 309 (1997)

Alvarez, J. ‘Judging the Security Council’. 90 Am J Int’l L 1 (1996)

Bowett, D. ‘Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the Settlement of Disputes’, 180 Receuil des Cours 169 (1983-II)

Charney, J. ‘Universal International Law’ in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87 (1993)

D’Aspremont, J. ‘The Abuse Of The Legal Personality Of International Organizations And The Responsibility Of Member States’ in International Organizations Law Review, Vol.4, No. 91 (2007).

Falk, R. ‘On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly’ in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Oct, 1966).

Hillgruber, C. ‘The Admission of New States to the International Community’ in European Journal of International Law Vol.9, No.3 (1998)

Peters, A. ‘International Dispute Settlement: A Network of Cooperational Duties’ 14 Eur J Int’l L 1 (2003).

Roberts, A.  ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconcilliation’. The American Journal of International Law.  Vol, 95, No.4 (Oct. 2001)

Sautman, B. “All that glitters is not gold: Tibet as a pseudo-state” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Monograph, No. 197 (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, (2009)

Sloan, B. ‘General Assembly Resolutions Revisited’. 58 Brit Ybk Int’l L 39 (1987)

Internet Sources

Austro-German Customs Union Case. Permanent Court of International Justice (1931). Accessed at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1931.09.05_customs/ retrieved on 2/05/2010

Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 1933. Accessed at http://www.cfr.org/publication/15897/montevideo_convention_on_the_rights_and_duties_of_states.html retrieved on 2/05/2010

Nicaragua v United States, 27^th June 1986, accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5 Retrieved on 6^th November 2009.

Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Advisory Opinion of 11^th April 1949.  Accessed at www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/gautier_4.pdf Retrieved on 2/05/2010

1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Accessed at www.untreaty.un.org on 25/04/2010

Lecture Notes

Shah, S. ‘International Legal Personality: Statehood and Recognition”, Lecture Notes, Principles of Public International Law. October 2009.